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When considering the best way for a country todeal with both its past and future during aperiod of transition after it has experienced
major social and constitutional changes, three possible
approaches can be taken:
• Looking back at the past, one may ask to what extent
criminal justice can and must be applied. Certainly,
trials in criminal courts after revolutions leading to
deep-rooted changes to society and state have taken
place are important tools to “do justice.” Convictions
have always been necessary and will always be. But is
that enough? Certainly not!
• To cope with the future, one has to find constructive
ways to find consolation, reconciliation and remorse.
• Finally, some conclusions need to be drawn on how
the rule of law of a particular state provides the means
of (and could be the basis for) finding a path through
that area of unavoidable tensions – the transition from
history to the future.
A revolution leading to the transformation of
government, (constitutional) law, culture, economy, and
society is part of the history of countries and always has
been. Looking back at recent history, at least three turning
points should be recalled.
These begin with Germany, which has twice undergone
deep-rooted transformations. First came the collapse after
the Second World War, when in 1945 the country was
defeated and liberated at the same time. The Nürnberg
Trials followed and the country had to make a completely
new start. Then in 1989/90 the country was reunited, an
unexpected “miracle of history.” The Unification Treaty of
1990 dealt with many transition issues, as did various court
decisions on the actions of the unjust government of the
former German Democratic Republic and its supporters –
namely the “wall-killings” involving police officers and
soldiers of the armed forces.
A second turning point was the transition of former
socialist countries from 1989 onwards. It was a significant
change of systems, from socialist democracy to free
democracy, rule of law and social state.
Third, the world faced change in South Africa in the
1990s, and has recently witnessed revolutionary activity in
Iraq, Afghanistan, Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and Syria. We see
the tribunals for former Yugoslavia and Ruanda at work, as
well as the International Criminal Court and the tribunal
for the former Pol Pot-regime in Cambodia. All of these
countries took, and continue to take, a turn towards a
more liberal human rights and rule-of-law democracy.
In other words, the problems of transitional justice can
be studied as quite a topical subject these days, and the
following remarks will deal with them in three parts:
criminal justice, reconciliation, and rule of law
understandings.
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: APPLICATION OF
CRIMINAL LAW
A German case study
German court rulings in “wall killing” cases illustrate the
shortcomings of criminal justice in such circumstances. On
August 13, 1961, the government of the German
Democratic Republic took security measures to seal the
border between the Soviet and Western Allied Sectors of
Berlin in order to cope with the increasing number of
people escaping from East Berlin and the territory of the
GDR to West Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany.
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A wall, more than 35 km long, was build through the centre
of Berlin, fortified with anti-personnel mines and
automatic fire-systems. A total of 136 people were killed
until the fall of the wall in 1989, primarily young men. After
the unification of Germany criminal charges were brought
against GDR border policemen and soldiers, as well as
those who occupied positions of command and political
power and were responsible for the border regime.
The accused claimed that their actions were legitimate:
they had to obey orders of their supervisors in the police
and military hierarchy. They also brought forward the
argument that conviction would be a violation of the rule
of law principle that there must be no ex post facto criminal
law. The following sequence of events took place:
• Various lower courts convicted policemen and soldiers
who had been involved in border killings.
• The Federal Court of Justice in 1993 confirmed the
convictions on appeal.
• In 1996 the Federal Constitutional Court ruled that
the convictions did not conflict with the “Basic Law”
as Germany’s Constitution is named.
• In addition, the European Court of Human Rights in
Strasbourg in 2001 decided that the European
Convention on Human Rights did not oppose the
convictions.
• Later on some 35 cases were brought to German
courts, and the accused were convicted, including
members of the GDR National Defence Council,
members of the Political Bureau of the Socialist Unity
Party and, finally, the President of the Council of State
of the former German Democratic Republic.
The tension between positivism and natural law
The basic problems with these cases lie in the conflict
between positivism and natural law. On the one hand,
deadly shooting at the border was – as the accused claimed
– legal and thus justified under police law, special
provisions to secure border control, and so on. On the
other hand, these actions by the soldiers were, for example,
criminal, and against all principles of just law,
proportionality, and human rights. In short a grave breach
of the law took place as we understand it to be “just” in our
minds and hearts. The gap between positive law and
natural law in these cases is so deep we conclude that
“formal positive law” must give way to material justice.
Then there is the equally difficult problem of the
prohibition of ex-post criminal law. It is a core provision of
rule of law, and in the words of the Basic Law (para 103, s 2):
“An Act may be punished only if it was defined by a law as
a criminal offence before the Act was committed.”
The problem was of course central to the Nürnberg
Trials of 1945 and after. Members of the Nazi Regime and
high-ranking military personnel were convicted on the
basis of criminal provisions, which the allies enacted after
the acts had been committed and sometimes even applied
norms which did not exist earlier (war crimes, military
aggression). In fact, the conviction of those who were
responsible for the war killings prior to 1989 was based on
(West) German criminal law. The question is indeed
whether these convictions were a breach of the prohibition
of ex post facto criminal law.
Looking more closely at the arguments which the
relevant courts made to establish their decisions, Markus
Rau has referred to the “natural law approach” of the
Federal Court of Justice; the “teleological approach” of the
Federal Constitutional Court; and the “Rule of Law
approach” of the European Court of Human Rights
Transitional Justice (see “The German Experience After
1989”, Lecture No 4 of the Rule of Law Programme South
East Europe, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, ed by Stefanie
Ricarda Roos, Bucarest 2009, pp 10 et seq).
Each of these approaches is examined further below.
The “natural law approach” of the Federal Court of Justice
The Federal Court of Justice held:
“A ground of justification assumed at the time of the offence
may (…) be disregarded due to a breach of higher ranking
law if it expresses an obvious gross violation of basic principles
of justice and humanity; the violation must be so grave that it
infringes the legal opinions common to all peoples and being
related to the value and dignity of man (…). The conflict
between the positive law and justice must be so unbearable
that the law as false law has to give way to justice. With these
formulations (…) it was tried, after the end of the national
socialist tyranny, to designate the most severe violations of
law. The transfer of these considerations to the case at hand is
not easy as the killings of people at the inner-German border
cannot be equated to the national socialist mass murder.
However, the comprehension reached then still holds true, i.e.
that in the assessment of offences being committed on
instruction of the state, one has to bear in mind whether the
state has transgressed the outer limits set to him according to
the common opinion in every country.” (46 Neue Juristische
Wochenschrift 141, at 144-45 (1993)).
The decision gives rise to some critical questions. The first
is a basic one, as far as the methodology of jurisprudence is
concerned: what are the “basic principles of justice of
humanity”? What is, in other words, the “material” core of
human rights, “material” justice? Is there a world-wide
agreement on meaning and content? There seems to be – as
with many broad terms and general clauses – a wide
“semantic openness” (n 2, at p 13). Secondly, “according to
the traditional view, national law that contravenes
international law does not become invalid.” This also holds
true for the peremptory norms of international law (jus
cogens). The idea of natural law being “interpreted” in the light
of international human rights law undermines this traditional
relationship between national and international law. 17
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The “teleological approach” of the Federal Constitutional
Court
The court enriched the “natural law approach” by
arguments of trust and confidence in the validity and
binding force of law, namely of the prohibition of ex post
facto criminal law, in a democratic state. The court held:
“The strict prohibition of ex post facto laws finds (…) its
justification, in a state governed by the rule of law, in the
particular foundation of confidence that backs criminal laws
when they are adopted by a democratic legislator being bound
to the basic rights. This particular foundation of confidence
ceases to exist when the other state adopted criminal laws for
the most severe criminal wrongs but excluded criminal liability
in part through grounds of justification by way of calling
upon (…) such criminal wrongs and abetting them, thus
severely disregarding the human rights generally accepted in
the international legal community. In doing so, the bearer of
governmental authority set extreme state injustice which may
hold its ground only so long as the governmental authority
being responsible virtually exits.
“In this particular situation, the command of material justice
which also implies acceptance of the international human
rights forbids the application of such a ground of justification.
The strict protection of confidence by Article 103, para. 2 of
the Basic Law must step back then. Otherwise, the
administration of criminal justice in the Federal Republic
would conflict with its premises resulting from the principle of
the state governed by the rule of law. The citizen who is
subject now to the penal power of the Federal Republic is
refused to invoke such a ground of justification ...” (50 Neue
Juristische Wochenschrift 929, at 930-31 (1997)).
In assessing the arguments of the court, one must first
note that the establishment of the ex post facto-prohibition
is more subtle and rooted in the law’s own rationality.
(Rau, n 1, at 13). Josef Isensee argued that the GDR’s
criminal law must not be interpreted through the
unhistorical glasses of the present in which the principle of
the state governed by the rule of law applies (see Josef
Isensee (ed), Vergangenheitsbewältigung durch Recht? Drei
Abhandlungen zu einem deutschen Problem, 1992, 91, at 106).
It is – in Isensee’s opinion – not the mere textual
identity of an isolated criminal norm that corresponds to
the prohibition of ex post criminal laws, but the content of
the norm in the context of the whole state system, ie the
real constitution of the policy. Bernhard Schlink stated:
“To regard as valid law not what is accepted and practiced as
law but what should be accepted and practiced as law deprives
the notion of law of one of its essential dimensions: reality.”
(see “Rechtsstaat und revolutionäre Gerechtigkeit” in
Vergangenheit als Zumutung, Öffentliche Vorlesung, 20 April
1995, at 9 (1996)).
The “rule of law approach” of the European Court
of Human Rights
The ECHR firstly referred to the provision of the GDR’s
“People’s Police Act” and “State Borders Act” which
authorised the use of firearms, including such norms as
“when firearms are used, human life should be preserved
where possible. Wounded persons must be given first aid.”
This was followed by: “The use of firearms is the most
extreme measure entailing the use of force against the
person” and “If possible firearms should not be used
against juveniles”.
The court held:
“These provisions, which therefore expressly included the
principle of proportionality and the principle that human life
must be preserved, should also be read in the light of the
principles enshrined in the Constitution of the GDR itself.
Article 89 § 2 of the Constitution provided: ‘Legal rules shall
not contradict the Constitution’; Article 19 § 2 provided:
‘Respect for and protection of the dignity and liberty of the
person are required of all State bodies, all forces in society and
every citizen’; lastly, Article 30 §§ 1 and 2 provided: ‘The
person and liberty of every citizen of the German Democratic
Republic are inviolable’ and ‘citizens’ rights may be restricted
only in so far as the law provides and when such restriction
appears to be unavoidable’…”
Moreover, the first chapter of the Special Part of the
GDR’s Criminal Code provided: “The merciless
punishment of crimes against … peace, humanity and
human rights … is an indispensable prerequisite for stable
peace in the world, for the restoration of faith in
fundamental human rights (…) and the dignity and worth
of human beings, and for the preservation of the rights of
all’ (…).” (European Court of Human Rights, Streletz,
Kessler and Krenz v Germany, judgment of March 22, 2001
(app nos 34044/96, 35532/97 and 44801/98, at §§ 60-
62, 64; see also European Court of Human Rights, K-H W
v Germany, judgment of March 22, 2001 (app no
37201797), at §§ 54-57, 59).
It may be misleading, however, to interpret the norms of
an unjust, even criminal state from other provisions of its
body of law as if that state were a rule of law state, whereas
in fact it was authoritarian and systematically neglecting the
essence of rule of law.
To sum up: all courts concurred in the final decision that
the prohibition of ex post facto criminal law was not to be
applied in these cases, and that finally the positive and
formal law has to give way to material justice. This is
“natural law interpretation” of the law and as such
disputable and subject to all established critical arguments
against it.18
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OTHER FORMS OF COPING WITH PAST
CRIMES AFTER TRANSITION:
“CONSTRUCTIVE JUSTICE”
Ways of looking back at the past to gain a better
perspective of the future
Criminal justice has a necessary part to play after
periods of transition, but it cannot create a successful
future on its own. Criminal justice looks back “in anger,”
and the system of trials, prosecution and conviction has its
limits. This becomes obvious when the notion is thought
through. If criminal justice is to be exercised in the fullest
sense, a rather large part of the population should be
brought before the court, eg after the Nazi and Communist
totalitarian systems. This would contradict with the
principle of a democratic rule of law state, so one must
turn to other instruments to cope with the legacy of an
unjust system.
Truth and reconciliation procedures
A well-known model for the process of reconciling a
nation’s past with its future is the establishment of a Truth
and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), as in South Africa,
Sierra Leone, Guatemala and Chile. As far as South Africa
was concerned:
• in 1991 the apartheid regime of W de Klerck started
negotiations with all political parties;
• in 1995 the Government of National Unity of
President Nelson Mandela stepped into power;
• in 1996 this government established the TRC, then
chaired by Archbishop Desmond Tutu.
The TRC was based on the establishing Act of 1995: “…
a commission is necessary exercise to enable South Africans
to come to terms with their past on a morally accepted basis
and to advance the cause of reconciliation.” (Promotion of
National Unity and Reconciliation Act No 34 of 1995;
cp Dullah Omar, former Minister of Justice).
South Africa wanted to realise a project of progressive
politics, to strive for the ideal of a “constructive
revolution”. The TRC’s work was aimed at helping to
establish reconciliation – the brotherhood of blacks and
whites – and getting rid of apartheid while addressing the
inequalities posed by rich and poor and offenders and
victims.
Everyone was invited by the TRC to claim responsibility
at the hearings, to tell, to explain, to testify, to put stone on
stone for a building of truth. There was no general amnesty
– which is also a possible instrument to structure a future
after big changes, clashes and revolutions. The
Commission, however, promised amnesty to accused
individuals and granted it, with a few exceptions. Financial
aid was also granted to victims.
The government’s main arguments for establishing a
TRC were:
• that tribunals encourage people to claim that they are
not guilty, whereas the Commission invites them to
tell the truth;
• tribunals punish, whereas the Commission rewards
those who repent;
In its final report of 1998 the TRC:
• condemned torture, killings and other crimes, but
made some prospective recommendations to
empower the poor by contributions of business – a
sort of wealth tax – to support social and economic
justice, to strengthen educational justice, and to create
equal opportunities;
• finally dealt with problems like AIDS and other
barriers to a better future.
Nelson Mandela welcomed the final report, Thabo
Mbeki (his successor as president) contested it before the
courts. The people accepted it widely.
Of course some criticisms are sound. It must have been
difficult for victims to understand and accept that those
who committed crimes left the Commission room as free
people. It is disputable whether amnesty – which is what
this was – can erase the past.
Access to information
The TRC hearings produced a lot of detail, and this pro-
vided an incentive for legislation on access to information in
various countries, notably Germany (InformationsfreiheitsG
of September 5, 2005 (BGBl I, p 2722)) which particularly
wanted to gain access to the files of the former GDR
Ministry of Security (Stasi-UnterlagenG of December 20,
1991 (BGBl I, p 162)). Access to information fulfils the
following purposes:
• supports the political, historical and legal recording of
the past, which is part of the reconciliation process;
• protects individual rights of victims, eg in claiming
damages;
• protects individuals against illegal use of their personal
data.
Knowing the facts furthers consolation and reduces the
“cognitive dissonance” between offenders and victims. Access to
information uncovers knowledge and additional historical
perspectives. Furthermore, it supports integration by making
secret information public knowledge so that the truth is known
instead of suspected. “Knowing” finally shows the faces on the
bottom of the fountain. (Kader-Asmal, Zur Rolle der
“Wahrheitskommission” in Südafrika, in: Gerd Hankel, Gerhard
Stuby (ed), Strafgerichte gegen Menschheitsverbrechen, Zum
Völkerstrafrecht 50 Jahre nach den Nürnberger Prozessen,
Hamburg 1995, pp 465-80, at 473).
Other instruments to deal with an unjust, even
criminal past
Usually civil servants and other administrative staff have
been members of the old leading party or political elite, or 19
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at least close to it. It is impossible, however, to uphold an
effective administration after transformation without their
knowledge and experience. In Germany after the Second
World War, the Allied forces established a bureaucratic
procedure for “de-nazification” of public staff. After the
reunification of Germany in 1990 civil servants retained
their positions except:
• when they had violated the principles of humanity and
rule of law, namely as vested in the Covenant of Civil
and Political Rights and the UN Declaration of
Human Rights;
• when they had been working for the Ministry of State
Security and therefore further employment in the civil
service could not be tolerated.
Using these criteria, evaluation of individuals took place.
The same criteria were applied more or less to soldiers of
the Peoples’ Army. The German Parliament processed self-
evaluation in the same way the ANC did in South Africa.
Criticism and self-criticism requires the capability to
repent and is of primary importance.
The results of a TRC or similar procedures enable
people to undergo a process of re-education and look – as
“teachers and students” – at historical events from a new
and wider perspective. Finally, issues of property and
expropriation had to be solved and a fair solution found.
Paragraph 143, section 2 of the German Basic law, as
amended after reunification, stated inter alia that illegal or
illegitimate expropriations had to be reverted, except for
expropriation during the occupation period (1945-49).
This decision is still highly disputed today.
All in all one can observe that the foundations for a better
future may be laid from constitutional and other public law
perspectives, as well as from criminal and civil law.
ROLE OF THE RULE OF LAW AND THE
TRANSITIONAL PROCESS
System-criminality
During the 20th century the world has learnt to
distinguish better between individual crimes and system-
criminality, and individual responsibility before the Penal
Code and state-criminality (macro-criminals like Hitler,
Stalin, Pol Pot, Idi Amin, Saddam Hussein, Ruanda
politicians and others). The development of “transitional
criminal law” is a sign that legal practice is moving in the
right direction. The International Tribunals for former
Yugoslavia (Mladic, Karadzic, Srebrenica, Vukovar) at least
do some justice to the victims and are a sign of hope to the
world. The same is true for the International Criminal
Court under the 1998 Statute of Rome, with its
jurisdiction on genocide, crimes against humanity, war
crimes and aggression.
This trend is also part of the development of
international law which holds humanitarian interventions
to be legitimate, such as those which took place in Kosovo
or Libya. A number of questions are raised by such
interventions – for example on the preservation of
sovereignty and the renunciation of force – but these can
be answered.
Rule of law principles
Transnational criminal law is part of a worldwide
acceptance of rule of law principles which are not always
implemented. There is agreement that:
“The ‘rule of law’ refers to a principle of governance in which all
persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including
the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly
promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated,
and which are consistent with international human rights norms
and standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence
to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law,
fairness in application of the law, separation of powers,
participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of
arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency.” (see, eg,
Report of the Secretary General of the United Nations on the
rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict
society; Doc. UN S/2004/616, no 6).
The rule of law is the lifeblood of any modern
cosmopolitan society. It is the basis of sound economic
development, and in the present era of globalization this is
more significant than ever. There is agreement that human
rights, separation of powers and access to an independent
judiciary are essential elements of the rule of law:
“This is important because it raises the question of the
normative foundation of the rule of law in international law:
Whereas certain and most important general principles of the
rule of law can be regarded as binding for all, there is, as far
as there is no binding international law, wide room and
discretion for national legislators to enact their individual
body of national laws according to their own traditions and
needs. We have to live with the permanent tension between
international disciplines and commitments and national policy
space.” (Berlin, Federal Foreign Office, Experts Conference on
the Rule of Law, November 30, 2007, conference
documentation, p 15).
Rule of law in this sense is not automatically secured in
countries after a rule of law and democratic transition. It
is an impulse for positive action, even though the European
Commission evaluated two members of the EU in 2001 for
making insufficient efforts to combat corruption, money
laundering, and conflicts of interest in administration, as
well as a failure to restructure police forces and the courts
and get rid of “roped parties” who were not willing to
change their minds and behaviour to adapt to new times.
It goes without saying that in any society the rule of law
is never a matter of the “law in the constitution and in the
books”. Rule of law must be applied, implemented,
supported and strengthened by the people. Effective rule20
Amicus Curiae Issue 90 Summer 2012
22419 Amicus 90 Summer text.qxd:Text  20/9/12  12:40  Page 20
21
Amicus Curiae Issue 90 Summer 2012
of law requires educated acceptance and confidence in
state institutions and persons holding office.
RULE OF LAW AND TOLERANCE
The central question is therefore what can the individual
do to strengthen the rule of law and open democracy in the
process of transition currently still in progress in some
areas of the world and newly initiated in others. First, the
careful study and teaching of rule of law principles, as well
as practising them in governance, can lay the foundation for
acceptance. Comparing government systems with those of
other nations (which prove to be more effective and
efficient) helps a lot. All this increases the chances of
improving understanding of the pre-conditions, structures
and importance of a rule of law democracy. Increased
understanding is not per se a guarantee for the establishment
of better morals and ethics in support of a free democratic
order, but can certainly be a trigger to do so.
After studying, discussing and applying the rule of law
with its elements of individual freedom, freedom of
speech, and participation and responsibilities, one has
established a firmly based position in support of a
democratic rule of law system, its opportunities and
challenges. But this is a frame of politics, not a strait-jacket.
What is also necessary is the tolerance of people, opinions,
designs and hopes for an individual and common future.
People should enjoy integration within that frame, but also
rejoice in a pluralism of opinions, perceptions and
practical politics. Without this type of tolerance the
movement for change will reach a dead end.
There is partnership as well as unavoidable tension
between the firm basic principles and values of a free
democracy, on the one hand, and a liberal tolerance to
other systems on the other. After a period of transition, it
might be difficult for people to keep this balance, but
achieving it is essential in order to ensure a peaceful
struggle for a better future.
Professor Dr Ulrich Karpen
Law Faculty, University of Hamburg
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